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COURT ESCAPES BY DUBIOUS MEANS
Legal Times
December 11, 2000
Stephen J. Wermiel
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Seeking a way out of the Bush-Gore
presidential dispute, the U.S. Supreme
Court last week reached deep into its bag
of procedural tricks and came up with an
obscure device that provided more of a
political than a legal escape.
Pundits rushed to put the best face on
the Court's action. "A triumph for good
sense and even for the rule of law,"
declared University of Chicago law
professor Cass Sunstein in The New York
Times. The justices "put Florida's
Supreme Court on notice: There is adult
supervision," proclaimed columnist
George Will in The Washington Post.
But when held up to the light, the Court's
decision is exposed for what it truly is: a
barely legitimate way to appear to do
nothing and yet still discard the Florida
Supreme Court's Nov. 21 decision.
At first glance, it's hard to find fault with
the U.S. Supreme Court's seven-page
opinion. The justices made it seem quite
logical, even routine and mundane, that
they would vacate the decision of the state
supreme court and send the case back to
clarify what role, if any, the Florida
Constitution played in that ruling. The
unsigned action by the justices cites their
1940 decision in Minnesota v. National
Tea Co. as support for vacating and
remanding, as if this precedent is one that
lawyers with any exposure to the Supreme
Court have at their fingertips.
A brief look at reported decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court paints a verydifferent
picture. The vacate-and-remand
procedure in Minnesota v. National Tea (a
dispute over taxes on chain stores) is a
rarely used, highly controversial device.
There are very few occasions when the
Court has disposed of a case by relying on
this precedent. In nearly every previous
instance, the justices were deeply divided
over the propriety of the procedure.
Consider a few curious details:
Although opinions by OThief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia have discussed Minnesota v.
National Tea on two occasions in recent
years, the last time the Court actually
dispatched a fully briefed and argued case
under this precedent was 1965
(Department of Mental Hygiene of
California v. Kirchner).
In the 60 years since it was issued,
Minnesota v. National Tea has been used
to dispose of only seven argued cases and
four cases before they were argued until
last week Of those 11 cases, there was at
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least one dissenting vote in all but one
1951 case.
In the 1983 case of Michigan v. Long,
Justice John Paul Stevens suggested in his
dissenting opinion that Minnesota v.
National Tea had been overruled.
Even the author of Michigan v. Long,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, criticized
the vacate-and-remand device as
"unsatisfactory both because of the delay
and decrease in efficiency of judicial
administration . . . and, more important,
because these methods of disposition
place significant burdens on state courts
to demonstrate the presence or absence of
our jurisdiction."
The closest analogous procedure arises in
criminal cases. In California v. Krivda
(1972), which was not cited last Monday,
the justices vacated and remanded a
criminal case so that a lower court could
clarify whether it had relied on defendants'
rights in the U.S. Constitution or on
similar provisions in a state constitution.
This maneuver was repeated often
between 1972 and 1983, but has been
dormant for the last 15 years. Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist, before he became chief
justice, criticized Krivda in a 1978 dissent,
noting, "By vacating the judgment below,
this Court is taking from appellants the
normal burden of demonstrating that we
have jurisdiction and placing it" on the
state court (Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.
v. Jerome).
If these points are not enough to make
you wonder about the Supreme Court's
unusual action in the election case,
consider the strongest criticism of the
vacate-and-remand procedure. In
December 1952, with a young Rehnquist
serving as one of his law clerks, Justice
Robert Jackson wrote a dissent in Dixon
v. Duffy
Both the wisdom and the legality of this
policy toward the highest court of a state
appear dubious to me. What we are doing,
in essence, is to vacate a state court
judgment, not because it is found to be
inconsistent with federal law, but because
the state court has not told us, with an
acceptable degree of formality, what
reasons led to rendering it.... Doubt of
our jurisdiction is no reason for exercising
it; quite the contrary is the rule.
The Minnesota v. National Tea decision
did little to reassure him, Justice Jackson
wrote, because it included "no
examination of the Court's power to
vacate."
Apparently the only real attempt to
examine that power was by Justice Scalia
in Stutson v. United States (1996). In a
dissent, he referred to the Court's "limited
power to vacate without first finding error
below." He explained that the vacate-and-
remand procedure "originates in the
special needs of federalism" to avoid "the
risk of improperly reversing a judgment
based on state law." But even Scalia said
that this policy has been "largely
supplanted."
So how could the Court rely on this
obscure, perhaps overruled precedent that
was neither cited nor argued by any lawyer
in the case? The absence of a sound legal
explanation leads to the conclusion that it
was a political escape.
The Court had other options. After
hearing argument, the justices could have
dismissed the case as "improvidently
granted" because it was not clear if there
was a federal issue to decide. But that
would have left the Florida Supreme
Court decision in place--a solution clearly
untenable to some of the justices.
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The Court could also have kept the case
and certified a question to the Florida
Supreme Court. Once that court answered
the question, the U.S. Supreme Court
would have ruled or dismissed the
petition. But this approach would not
have given the justices a way out, either
for those who didn't want to hear the case
in the first place or for those who became
convinced during briefing and argument
that they could not resolve the dispute.
While the Court may have taken the case
with the goal of providing "adult
supervision," by turning to Minnesota v.
National Tea the justices appear to have
been playing games with the law.
Stephen J. Wermiel is associate director
of the Program on Law and Government
at American University Washington
College of Law and teaches constitutional
law and a seminar on the Supreme Court.
Copyright * 2000 NLP IP Company
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Disgrace
The New Republc
December25, 2000
Jeffrey Rosen
On Monday, when the Supreme Court
heard arguments in Bush v. Gore, there
was a sense in the courtroom that far
more than the election was at stake. I ran
into two of the most astute and fair-
minded writers about the Court, who have
spent years defending the institution
against cynics who insist the justices are
motivated by partisanship rather than
reason. Both were visibly shaken by the
Court's emergency stay of the manual
recount in Florida; they felt naive and
betrayed by what appeared to be a naked
act of political will. Surely, we agreed, the
five conservatives would step back from
the abyss.
They didn't. Instead, they played us all for
dupes once more. And, by not even
bothering to cloak their willfulness in legal
arguments intelligible to people of good
faith who do not share their views, these
four vain men and one vain woman have
not only cast a cloud over the presidency
of George W. Bush. They have, far more
importantly, made it impossible for
citizens of the United States to sustain any
kind of faith in the rule of law as
something larger than the self-interested
political preferences of William Rehnquist,
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
Anthony Kennedy, and Sandra Day
O'Connor.
This faith in law as something more than
politics has had powerful opponents
throughout the twentieth century. For
everyone from legal realists and critical
race theorists to contemporary
pragmatists, it has long been fashionable
to insist that the reasons judges give are
mere fig leaves for their ideological
commitments. Nevertheless, since its
founding, The New Republic has resisted
this cynical claim. From Learned Hand
and Felix Frankfurter to Alexander Bickel,
the editors of this magazine have insisted
that, precisely because legal arguments are
so malleable, judges must exercise radical
self-restraint. They should refuse to
second-guess the decisions of political
actors, except in cases where
constitutional arguments for judicial
intervention are so powerful that people
of different political persuasions can
readily accept them. This magazine has
long argued that the legitimacy of the
judiciary is imperiled whenever judges
plunge recklessly into the political thicket.
And this has led editors of different
political persuasions to oppose the judicial
invalidation of laws we disagreed with as
well as those we supported--from
Progressive-era labor laws to the New
Deal administrative state to laws
restricting abortion and permitting
affirmative action. In all these cases, we
argued that judges should stay their hand.
Our views about judicial abstinence have
been those of Oliver Wendell Holmes: "If
my fellow citizens want to go to hell, I will
help ther," he said. "It's my job." But in
Bush v. Gore, as in Dred Scott and Roe v.
Wade, the justices perceived their job
differently. They foolishly tried to save the
country from what they perceived to be a
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crisis of legitimacy. And they sent
themselves to hell in the process.
The unsigned per curiam opinion in Bush
v. Gore is a shabby piece of work
Although the justices who handed the
election to Bush--O'Connor and
Kennedy-- were afraid to sign their names,
the opinion unmasks them more nakedly
than any TV camera ever could. To
understand the weakness of the
conservatives' constitutional argument,
you need only restate it: Its various
strands collapse on themselves. And,
because their argument is tailor-made for
this occasion, the conservatives can point
to no cases that directly support it. As
Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer wrote in
their joint dissent, this "can only lend
credence to the most cynical appraisal of
the work of judges throughout the land."
What, precisely, is the conservatives'
theory? "Having once granted the right to
vote on equal terms, the State may not, by
later arbitrary and disparate treatment,
value one person's vote over that of
another," they declare. The citation is
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the
case that invalidated the poll tax in 1966
on the grounds that it invidiously
discriminated against the poor. But there
is no claim here that Florida's recount law,
shared by 32 other states, discriminates
against the poor. Indeed, Florida argued
that its scheme is necessary to avoid
discrimination against the poor, because a
uniform system of recounting that treated
the punch-card ballots used in poor
neighborhoods the same as the optically
scanned ballots used in rich ones would
systematically undercount the votes of
poorer voters. By preventing states from
correcting the counting errors that result
from different voting technologies, the
conservatives have precipitated a violation
of equal treatment far larger than the one
they claim to avoid.
"The fact finder confronts a thing, not a
person," write the conservatives in a
clumsy and perverse inversion of the
famous line from Reynolds v. Sims, the
great malapportionment case, which noted
that "legislators represent people, not
trees." But things do not have
constitutional rights; people have
constitutional rights. It is absurd to claim
that the "right" of each ballot to be
examined in precisely the same manner as
every other ballot defeats the right of each
individual to have his or her vote counted
as accurately as possible. Were this theory
taken seriously, many elections over the
past 200 years would have violated the
equal protection clause, because they were
conducted using hand counts with
different standards. The effect of the
majority's whimsical theory is to fan the
suspicion, which now looks like a
probability, that the loser of both the
popular vote and the electoral vote has
just become president of the United
States. At least the ballots can sleep
peacefully.
The conservatives can rustle up only two
cases that purportedly support their
theory that Florida's recount scheme gave
"arbitrary and disparate treatment to
voters in its different counties." (Both
were written in the 1960s by liberal activist
Justice William Douglas, which must have
given the conservatives a private chuckle.)
The first case, Gray v. Sanders, held that
Georgia's county-based scheme of
assigning votes in the Democratic U.S.
senatorial primary discriminated against
voters in urban counties, whose votes
were worth less than those in rural
counties. The same logic, applied to this
case, would hold that the Florida
legislature could not adopt a county-based
scheme for assigning votes in presidential
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elections. But this conclusion is
completely inconsistent with the
conservatives' earlier argument, the one
that emboldened them to stop the manual
recount in the first place: that Article 2 of
the Constitution allows the Florida
legislature to structure its presidential
electing system however it chooses. The
second case, Moore v. Ogilvie, held that
applying "a rigid, arbitrary formula to
sparsely settled counties and populous
counties alike ... discriminate d against the
residents of the populous counties of the
State in favor of rural sections." That case,
in other words, does not support the
conservatives' claim that ballots in rural
and urban counties must be counted and
recounted in precisely the same manner. It
suggests the opposite.
The reason the conservatives can find not
a single precedent to support their equal
protection theory is because the theory is
made up for this case only. But the
damage is not so easily limited. The
Supreme Court has called into question
not only the manual-recount procedure
adopted by the legislature of Florida but
our entire decentralized system of voting--
in which different counties use different
technologies to count different ballots
designed differently and cast at different
hours of the day. In addition to throwing
the presidential election and destroying
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, Bush
v. Gore will spawn an explosion of federal
lawsuits after every close election, lawsuits
arguing that different counties used
different ballot designs and voting systems
and counted the ballots in different ways.
In this way, Bush v. Gore is a ludicrous
expansion of cases like Shaw v. Reno, in
which the same five-member conservative
majority, led by the addled and uncertain
Sandra Day O'Connor, held that federal
courts must second-guess each legislative
exercise in state and federal redistricting to
decide whether or not race was the
"predominant purpose" in drawing district
lines. The idea that this usurpation of our
democratic electoral system by the federal
judiciary has been precipitated by a group
of conservatives who once posed as
advocates of judicial restraint and
champions of state legislatures can only be
met with what the legal scholar Charles
Black called the sovereign prerogative of
philosophers: laughter.
But the majority asks us not to worry
about the implications of its new
constitutional violation. "Our
consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities," the justices
write. It certainly does. But a mobilized
nation is now far less likely to tug its
collective forelock and wait for the
preening O'Connor and Kennedy to sort
out the confusion on our behalf. We've
had quite enough of judicial saviors.
In a poignant attempt to split the
difference between the two camps,
Justices Breyer and David Souter tried to
prevent the Court from destroying itself.
They agreed that applying different
counting standards to identical ballots in
the same county might violate the equal
protection clause, and they proposed
sending the ballots back to Florida and
letting its courts apply a uniform counting
standani. But their attempt at
statesmanship was crudely rejected by
O'Connor and Kennedy, which left Breyer
and Souter with their hands extended,
played for dupes like everyone else who
naively believed the conservatives were
operating in good faith. "Because the
Florida Supreme Court has said that the
Florida Legislature intended to obtain the
safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C Sec. 5,"
O'Connor and Kennedy wrote in the
tortuous punch line of their opinion,
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"Justice Breyer's proposed remedy--
remanding to the Florida Supreme Court
for its ordering of a constitutionally
proper contest until December 18--
contemplates action in violation of the
Florida election code." With this feint at
deference to the state court at precisely
the moment there was nothing left to
defer to, the jig was up. O'Connor and
Kennedy had converted the Florida
court's passing reference to the federal law
telling Congress which electoral slate to
count in the event that a controversy was
resolved before December 12 into a
barrier, now mysteriously embedded in
state law, that prevented the Florida
Supreme Court from completing manual
recounts after December 12. And for the
Court to announce this rule at ten o'clock
at night on December 12, after having
stopped the count two precious days
earlier, only added to the gallows humor.
It will be impossible to look at O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas
in the same light again, much as it was
impossible to look at President Clinton in
the same light after seeing him exposed in
the Starr Report. But this time the self-
exposure is also a little bracing.
Conservatives have lectured us for more
than 30 years about the activism of the
Warren and Burger Courts. Those tinny
and hypocritical lectures are now,
thankfully, over. By its action on
December 12, the Supreme Court has
changed the terms of constitutional
discourse for years to come. Just as Roe v.
Wade galvanized conservatives a
generation ago to rise up against judicial
activism, so Bush v. Gore will now
galvanize liberals and moderates for the
next generation. But, unlike the
conservative opponents of Roe, liberals
must not descend to the partisanship of
the current justices; they must transcend
it. The appropriate response to Bush v.
Gore is not to appoint lawless liberal
judges who will use the courts as
recklessly as the conservatives did to
impose their sectarian preferences on an
unwilling nation. The appropriate
response, instead, is to appoint genuinely
restrained judges, in the model of
Ginsburg and Breyer, who will use their
power cautiously, if at all, and will
dismantle the federal judiciarys imperious
usurpation of American democracy.
Those of us who have consistently, if
perhaps naively, opposed liberal and
conservative judicial activism throughout
the years can now point to Roe and Bush
as two sides of the same coin. (How
fitting that Bush is now a dubious
president and a dubious precedent.)
In his dissent in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, the abortion case that
reaffirmed Roe in 1992, Scalia recalled the
portrait of Chief Justice Taney that hangs
in the Harvard Law School library. Taney
had led a bitterly divided Supreme Court
to strike down the Missouri Compromise;
but, instead of saving the nation from its
partisan divisions, his reckless
intervention precipitated the Civil War
There seems to be on his face, and in his
deep-set eyes, an expression of profound
sadness and disillusionment. Perhaps he
always looked that way, even when
dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts.
But those of us who know how the luster
of his great Chief Justiceship came to be
eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help
believing that he had that case--its already
apparent consequences for the Court and
its soon-to-be-played-out consequences
for the Nation--burning on his mind. I
expect that two years earlier he, too, had
thought himself "calling the contending
sides of national controversy to end their
national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution." It is
no more realistic for us in this litigation,
than it was for him in that, to think that
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an issue of the sort they both involved ...
can be "speedily and finally settled" by the
Supreme Court.... Quite to the contrary,
by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the
deep passions this issue arouses, by
banishing the issue from the political
forum that gives all participants, even the
losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing
and an honest fight, by continuing the
imposition of a rigid national rule instead
of allowing for regional differences, the
Court merely prolongs and intensifies the
anguish.
Who would have dreamed that in
describing Taney's portrait Scalia imagined
his own?
Copyright 0 2000 New Republic, Inc.
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BUSH v. GORE: A Special Report; Election Case a Test amd Trauma
forJustices
The New Yok Times
Tuesday, February 20, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
The last time the justices of the Supreme
Court appeared together in public was at
the inauguration of President George W.
Bush, their presence on the platform
providing the starkest reminder possible
of the court's extraordinary role in
deciding the outcome of the 2000
election.
In recess since that wintry afternoon, the
court as an institution has been all but
invisible. But the justices themselves have
been busy. Across the court's ideological
spectrum, in ways both subtle and direct,
they have been reaching out to reassure
the public -- and perhaps each other --
that all is well at the court despite the
bitter words spoken and deep divisions
revealed by the 5-to-4 vote in Bush v.
Gore.
From Justice Stephen G. Breyer's remark
to a law school audience in Lawrence,
Kan., that the explanation for the decision
"isn't ideology and it isn't politics" to
Justice Antonin Scalia's comment to law
students in San Diego that "if you can't
disagree without hating each other, you
better find another profession other than
the law," the justices are behaving almost
like survivors of a natural disaster who
need to talk about what happened in order
to regain their footing and move on.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking at
the University of Melbourne Law School
in Australia, in no way receded from her
view that the decision was seriously
misguided. But both for her foreign
audience and for the domestic one to
which the court's press office distributed
her text, she offered a measured and
nuanced account of the context in which
the election controversy reached the court
and of the belief among respected opinion
leaders that a national crisis required the
court's intervention.
As the justices have made their rounds of
law school forums and civic events, their
eagerness to discuss the court's current
mood has not, unsurprisingly, been
matched by a willingness to reveal the
internal deliberations over the 20-day
period in which the court received,
accepted and decided the Bush legal
team's two appeals from consecutive
rulings of the Florida Supreme Court.
The justices regard the deliberations of
"the conference" -- the nine meeting alone
behind closed doors -- as close to
sacrosanct. They met privately, without
even their law clerks present, three times
on the election cases, and details of those
conversations remain private.
Consequently, any effort to
narrative of those 20 days
substantial gaps and
unanswered questions.
construct a
encounters
intriguing
Nonetheless, it has been possible through
reporting at the court and a close
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rereading of the court's opinions during
the period to gain fresh insight into some
central moments in the all-consuming
event. It was a drama that from the
beginning generated more internal conflict
than was generally known and that ended
with the exhausted justices working into
the night, drawing their window blinds
against the penetrating glare of the
television satellite trucks that ringed the
court as the country waited to learn
whether the 2000 presidential election was
finally over.
In their public remarks, justices from
across the divide of the decision have sent
a twofold message: first, that the court
was engaged in an appropriately judicial
act rather than an illegitimately political
one (significantly, this message was
delivered by the Bush v. Gore dissenters);
and second, that despite their sharp
disagreement, the justices can still get
along and their institutional bond remains
strong. Indeed, not three weeks after the
Dec. 12 decision, Justice Scalia and his
wife, Maureen, joined Justice Ginsburg
and her husband, Martin, for a New
Year's Eve dinner, a tradition the two
ideologically opposite justices have
maintained for years.
The imperative of moving on to the next
case is a powerful one at the court, and
there is little doubt as the court
reconvenes Tuesday that the justices' view
is on the cases that lie ahead rather than
on the trauma they are working to put
behind them
But 10 weeks after Bush v. Gore, the full
extent of that trauma, both for the court
and for the justices as individuals, is
nonetheless coming into some focus.
Throughout the period, events moved so
quickly that only in retrospect have some
elements become clear, for example, that
the opaque unanimous opinion by which
the court decided the first appeal was
intended as a considerably sharper
warning to the Florida Supreme Court
than its mild language and bland tone
suggested.
And it is also obvious now that there was
a general misreading of the justices' initial
decision in the first appeal to discard the
Bush legal team's equal-protection
challenge to the Florida recount. That
claim, based on the argument that a partial
recount in only four counties violated the
14th Amendment by weighting some
votes more than others, was then still
pending in a companion case before a
federal appeals court. The justices'
decision to delete the equal-protection
issue from the first Bush appeal reflected
a conclusion that the question was not yet
ripe for review rather than that it was
uninteresting or irrelevant.
In fact, during the argument in the second
case, two of the justices who eventually
dissented, Justice Breyer and Justice David
H Souter, became close allies and tried to
build a strategy for rescuing the recount
based on the expressed equal-protection
concerns of one justice, Anthony L
Kennedy. But Justice Kennedy instead
became the co-author of the majority
decision that rejected further counting.
Whether Justices Breyer and Souter ever
had a realistic chance of turning the
outcome around, and how close they
might have come, remain unanswered
questions. While the Gore lawyers had
hoped to sway both Justice Kennedy and
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, two
Stanford graduates who often find
themselves allies on the more moderate
end of the court's dominant conservative
wing, it appears that Justice O'Connor did
not waver in her position against recounts.
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While it is already fading into a single
seamless blur, the Supreme Court's
involvement in the election proceeded in a
series of discrete steps. There were two
separate cases. The first, Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, was an
appeal from the Florida Supreme Court's
decision to order a 12-day extension for
certifying the results of recounts in four
counties. It was argued on Dec. 1 and
decided three days later with a unanimous
decision that told the Florida court to do a
better job of explaining its rationale for
the extension.
The second case, Bush v. Gore, was an
appeal from the Florida Supreme Court's
decision ordering a statewide recount of
the "undervotes," ballots that machines
had read as indicating no presidential
choice. Argued on Dec. 11, it was decided
late the next night by a 5-to-4 decision
declaring that the lack of uniform
standards for counting the votes made the
recount unconstitutional.
The majority said there was no time to
send the case back for a better recount
because it was already Dec. 12, the date
set by federal election law by which
electors had to be chosen if their right to
cast their state's electoral votes was to be
immune from challenge. With the
dissenters arguing vainly that the only
deadline that mattered was the Dec. 18
date for casting electoral votes, and with
Vice President Al Gore trailing by a few
hundred votes, the contest for Florida's
decisive 25 electoral votes was over.
Based on the best available information,
and in some instances on a new reading of
the court's published opinions in light of
that information, what follows is a
chronological account of how the
Supreme Court came to decide the
presidential election.
Opening the Floodgate
When the court announced on the day
after Thanksgiving that it would hear the
first Bush appeal, surprising nearly all who
had assumed the justices would do their
best to stay away from a politically
charged case that appeared completely
grounded in state law, there was
considerable speculation about what lay
behind the decision. The announcement
was unsigned and gave no indication of
the vote. The votes of four justices are
required to accept a case. There was no
way to tell whether the court was divided
on the wisdom of granting the case or
whether perhaps the court as a whole,
sensing that the problem in Florida might
be spinning out of control, had concluded
that it was prudent to intervene sooner
rather than later.
It is now known that the court was
sharply split. The move to hear the case,
driven by the justices who eventually ruled
in Mr. Bush's favor, foreshadowed and
helped shape the later division on the
court, a division that the intervening
unanimous decision papered over even
more thinly than it appeared to at the
time.
While the Bush team did not bring the
case to the court until Nov. 22, the
justices were hardly oblivious to what was
taking place in Florida. The state-court
struggle over the partial recount and its
timetable had already spilled over into
federal court, where the Bush lawyers had
raised objections based on the
constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and due process. That drew the
justices' attention by positioning the
dispute as one of constitutional
dimension, and therefore potentially
within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, as
opposed to a state-law question of the
procedures for conducting a recount, an
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issue that would remain the province of
the Florida court system.
As the federal case moved quickly up the
judicial ladder, one justice who watched
with particular interest was Justice
Kennedy. As circuit justice for the United
States Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, he has administrative
responsibility for emergency cases
reaching the court from federal and state
courts in Georgia, Alabama and Florida.
Named to the court by President Ronald
Reagan in 1987 to fill a seat left open by
the failure of Robert H Bork's
nomination, Justice Kennedy occupies a
central and somewhat ambiguous position
on the court. Despite Justice Kennedy's
strong opposition to policies that take race
into account in redistricting or public
contracting, his votes to reaffirm the right
to abortion and to strike down an anti-gay
provision of the Colorado Constitution
have nonetheless made him an object of
suspicion among conservatives
In the court's previous term, Justice
Kennedy had written the majority opinion
in a Hawaii case that raised equal-
protection concerns about a special-
election system there. The equal-
protection argument in the Bush team's
federal case caught Justice Kennedy's
attention.
As it happened, appeals in both the
federal and state cases reached the court
simultaneously on Thanksgiving eve. But
the federal case was procedurally
unattractive because the appeals court had
not yet ruled. The Bush lawyers were
asking the justices to skip over the appeals
court and address the refusal of a federal
district judge in Miami, Donald M.
Middlebrooks, to stop the recount.
Although the Supreme Court has the
authority to intervene at this stage, it
rarely does.
The state case, by contrast, was ripe for
review. The Florida Supreme Court had
issued a definitive ruling the day before to
extend the certification deadline by 12
days so that the recounts sought by the
Gore team in four counties could be
completed. That unanimous decision by a
state court the justices knew well for its
liberal leanings struck some justices as a
partisan effort to manipulate the rules in
order to bring about a Gore victory.
The justices who became the dissenters in
Bush v. Gore assumed the court would
stay away from the Florida election. They
were startled to learn from a
memorandum that circulated shortly
before the justices met on the day after
Thanksgiving to discuss the appeals that
the votes were there to take the state court
case. The eventual dissenters' objections
were unavailing, and the discussion turned
to which issues the court was prepared to
consider.
The appeal from the state court decision
also included an equal-protection claim,
although as something of an afterthought
compared with the central role for equal
protection in the federal case. The main
questions in the appeal were, first, the
meaning and enforceability of a federal
law offering a state's electors a "safe
harbor" from later challenge if they are
chosen by procedures in effect before
Election Day, and second, whether the
state court's decision extending the vote-
counting deadline had unconstitutionally
supplanted the role of the Legislature.
Despite their interest in the equal-
protection issue, the justices decided to
excise it in order to allow the federal
appeals court to consider it in the more
fully developed context of the federal
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case. The federal appeal, in turn, was
denied "without prejudice," a signal that
the disposition was essentially procedural
and an invitation to the Bush lawyers to
present the question again later.
In retrospect, it is tempting to conclude
that the initial fateful decision to hear the
first case made the eventual outcome all
but inevitable, that a narrow majority had
set the court on a path from which there
was no other logical exit unless the Florida
Supreme Court itself backed down. That
view is held in some quarters at the court,
but it is not the only view; like much
about the election cases, even in the
simplest narrative form, perspectives
differ and considerable ambiguity remains.
A Winner With a Grievance
In any event, even as the court braced
itself for the Dec. 1 argument in the first
case, the picture on the ground in Florida
was changing rapidly. The extended
recount period ended on Nov. 26 with
Mr. Bush still ahead. The Florida secretary
of state, Katherine Harris, declared him
the winner, leaving him in an odd position
as a Supreme Court appellant. As a
practical matter, Mr. Bush could claim no
injury from the decision he was appealing.
Under Florida election law, the "protest"
phase for challenging the vote count was
now over. One question obviously on the
justices' minds during the first argument
was whether the case still mattered.
The argument itself did not dispel the
doubts about the appeal's continued
relevance, a fact that may have made it
easier for the court to reach a compromise
in the form of the unsigned six-page
opinion issued midmorning on Monday,
Dec. 4. The ruling vacated the Florida
Supreme Court's Nov. 21 decision and
instructed the state court to demonstrate
it had taken proper account of certain
statutory and constitutional provisions
governing federal elections.
Decoding a 9-to-O Ruling
Opacity may have been the price of
unanimity; in retrospect, it is clear there
was a rather strong message contained
within the cryptic opinion and that the
court's queries to the Florida justices
reflected more than an abstract interest in
the outcome. But the pace of events in
Florida was such that some justices who
retained strong doubts about whether the
court should be in the case at all could at
least take cold comfort from the growing
assumption that the election would be
over before the case could come back to
haunt the Supreme Court again.
That assumption appeared to be validated
when, within hours, Judge N. Sanders
Sauls of the state circuit court in
Tallahassee issued a sweeping rejection of
Mr. Gore's challenge to Mr. Bush's
certified victory. But late in the week, the
Florida Supreme Court weighed in again,
not only reversing Judge Sauls but also
ordering a statewide recount of the
undervotes to begin the next day.
The breadth of that decision was startling,
and even some justices who eventually
ruled that the recount should go forward
were momentarily taken aback. To the
eventual majority, the decision was not
only startling, but wrong. As Justice
O'Connor was to indicate by her
questions from the bench, it appeared that
the state court had willfully ignored a clear
warning to reverse course. She is a tough
and active questioner, a stickler for
procedure who does not hide her
displeasure when she suspects a lawyer, or
a lower court, of cutting corners. A
former majority leader of the Arizona
State Senate, Justice O'Connor, a
I1
Republican, is the only current justice to
have held elective office.
Within hours of the state court's ruling on
Friday, Dec. 8, the Bush team had filed
both an appeal and a request for a stay of
the imminent recount. The endgame had
begun, and tightly packed into the next
four days would come moments of high
drama and emotion.
The eventual dissenters expected the court
to hear the appeal swiftly, but the decision
to stop the recount in the meantime came
as a shock. The tension and anger that the
court had managed to contain under a
veneer of civility erupted for all to see.
There were now, openly, two sides, and
the vote was 5 to 4.
The pace of events, already scarcely
believable by the Supreme Court's stately
standards, was to become amazingly
compressed: state court decision Friday
afternoon; Supreme Court appeal filed
Friday night; case accepted Saturday,
briefs due Sunday, argument Monday,
decision Tuesday. No one had seen
anything like it. By the time three New
York University Law School professors
arrived at the court on Tuesday morning
to interview law clerks for teaching
positions, complete exhaustion had set in,
and some clerks who had not canceled
their long-scheduled appointments slept
through them.
The justices met early on Saturday to
consider the stay application and the
appeal. The recount had just begun in
Florida, but it was soon clear that the
majority at the court had the votes to stop
it. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas, all
voted to grant the stay.
On the other side was Justice John Paul
Stevens, the senior associate justice and, at
80, the oldest member of the court. A
Republican, named to the court by
President Gerald Ford, he had become in
many respects the most liberal justice and,
on his side of the court, the most
outspoken. Justices Souter, Breyer and
Ginsburg voted with him.
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, a
former attorney general and state supreme
court justice from New Hampshire, was a
lifelong Republican who found that his
party's center of gravity had shifted
uncomfortably to his right. Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, President Bill
Clinton's two appointments, were judicial
moderates, both former law professors
and federal appeals court judges whose
instincts were to search for compromise
rather than confrontation.
But there was to be no compromise at this
point. Justice Stevens wrote a sharp three-
paragraph dissent from the stay. The
majority had "acted unwisely" to "stop the
counting of legal votes," Justice Stevens
said. The other three signed the dissent.
While a published dissent from an order
like a stay is unusual, this one had the
effect of goading Justice Scalia into doing
something even more unusual, publishing
a defense of the stay. The recount had to
be stopped because it threatened
ireparable harm" to Mr. Bush, Justice
Scalia said, "by casting a cloud on what he
claims to be the legitimacy of his
election."
No one on Justice Scalia's side signed his
opinion; some questioned the wisdom of
publishing it and further revealing the
court's internal conflict. If any one justice
was to have made such a public statement,
Justice Scalia, who relishes intellectual
combat and has never been known to pull
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punches, was certainly the most likely
candidate.
The absence of other signatures on the
Scalia opinion made him appear to be the
driving force behind the court's action,
but that was not the case. Although his
role was less visible, Chief Justice
Rehnquist took an active part from the
beginning in shaping the court's response
to the events in Florida. Approaching his
29th anniversary on the court, with nearly
15 years as chief justice, he runs the court
with a firm hand and views stepping up to
the big cases as part of his institutional
responsibility. But in the end, he tried and
ultimately failed to speak for the court in
this case.
Following the vote on the stay, the
dissenters were shaken and demoralized,
fearful that the court, having so narrowly
dodged a bullet by managing to turn out a
unanimous opinion the previous weekend,
was about to do itself great harm. The
court is not a place where people casually
drop in to one another's offices to chat,
but the dissenters reached out to one
another for moral support. A consolation
was that Justice Scalia had taken the bait
of the Stevens dissent, perhaps giving the
public a warning of what now seemed an
inevitable outcome.
A Rationale for Mistrust
With the case set for argument, each side
faced a challenge. For the dissenters, the
question was whether there was any
strategy by which they could split the
majority and get the recount going again.
For the majority, the deep mistrust they
shared of the Florida Supreme Court's
motives was not matched by an agreed-
upon view of where exactly, as a legal
matter, the state court had gone wrong.
The majority had a conclusion in search
of a rationale.
The equal-protection issue was before the
court again, but it had evolved into
something new. The question was no
longer whether it was constitutional to
recount votes in some counties and not
others, but whether it was constitutional
to count votes by standards that differed
from county to county. This evolution
gave Justice Breyer something to work
with. If a lack of uniform standards was
the problem, the solution was obvious:
establish a standard, or instruct the
Florida court to set one, and start
counting.
During the argument on Monday
morning, it was evident that Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, was
offering this option in an effort to sway
Justice Kennedy and perhaps Justice
O'Connor. Both had expressed some
uncertainty about the other legal theories
behind the Bush appeal. But they gave no
indication during the argument of being
receptive to Justice Breyer's approach.
The question was whether the Florida
Supreme Court could be trusted to
supervise a recount under any
circumstances. It appears that for Justice
O'Connor, the answer was decidedly no.
Justice Kennedy came more slowly and
ambivalently to the same conclusion.
There would be no more counting.
Even if Justice Kennedy had been open to
Justice Breyer's persuasion, it is not clear
what would have happened next. Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens did not agree that
the recount as ordered by the Florida
court posed a problem of constitutional
dimension. For them, therefore, there was
no need for a remand or for new
standards. Whether to join a compromise
that took such a need as its starting
premise was a decision they ultimately did
not have to confront because the
compromise did not gel.
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'Loser Is Perfectly Clear'
Although the outcome was clear by
Monday night, the justices' work was not
done. Justice Stevens drafted a dissenting
opinion whose bitter words became the
most widely quoted language from any of
the opinions. The majority's position "can
only lend credence to the most cynical
appraisal of the work of judges
throughout the land," he wrote, adding:
"Although we may never kn9w with
complete certainty the identity of the
winner of this year's presidential election,
the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.
It is the nation's confidence in the judge
as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law." Justice Stevens left Washington for
his second home, in South Florida, as he
had long planned for the year-end recess
that was supposed to be under way.
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg signed the
Stevens dissent while each offering an
individual view as well. (While Justice
Ginsburg's opinion drew considerable
notice for its omission of the adverb
"respectfully" from the closing "I dissent,"
that was a choice, it was pointed out, that
she frequently made for economy of style
rather than to convey a particular level of
anger.)
Justice Souter did not sign. He wrote his
own dissent and also signed the major
portion of the Ginsburg and Breyer
dissents. While Justice Souter's writing
style can be convoluted, in this instance it
was so direct as to be almost
conversational, his anger controlled but
his extreme disappointment evident. "I
write separately only to say how
straightforward the issues before us really
are," he said.
Photographs taken later of the justices as
they drove out of the building's
underground garage showed Justices
Scalia and Breyer looking grim but
determined, while Justice Souter looked
hollow-eyed and ashen.
Throughout the building, justices worked
into the night. The Supreme Court
building is constructed around four
interior courtyards, with the chambers
arrayed around the outer perimeter, facing
the street. The bright lights from the
television networks' satellite trucks,
mounted on high poles, shone into the
justices' windows. Some found the harsh
light unnerving, while to others, the public
spotlight seemed somehow appropriate,
given the gravity of the public's business
being conducted inside. Supreme Court
police officers made their rounds, advising
justices and law clerks to draw the blinds
in case someone tried to take pictures
through the windows.
Majority but Not a Monolith
On the majority side, Chief Justice
Rehnquist circulated an opinion that had
the support of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
It said that in ordering the recount, the
Florida Supreme Court had
unconstitutionally displaced a role
reserved for the state legislature and had
ignored the Florida Legislature's desire to
give the state's electors the benefit of the
"safe harbor" against later challenge on
the floor of Congress that federal law
offered to slates of electors chosen by
Dec. 12. (While 20 states failed to meet
the Dec. 12 deadline for submitting slates
of electors without any jeopardizing their
votes in the Electoral College, the
outcome of the election in those states
was not disputed. In Florida, by contrast,
Republican legislative leaders had
announced plans for a special session to
choose the Legislature's own slate of Bush
electors.)
But although intended as a majority
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opinion, the chief justice's opinion failed
to get the support of Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor. They drafted their own
opinion, concluding that the standardless
recount violated the guarantee of equal
protection. Their opinion later caused
some confusion by its reference to "seven
justices of the court" who "agree that
there are constitutional problems with the
recount." That was true, but it was also
beside the point, because by then the only
question was whether there was a remedy
for those problems, in the form of a
restructured but continuing recount. On
that question, the vote remained 5 to 4.
A Singular Case
It is not clear from the face of the
Kennedy-O'Connor opinion, labeled only
"per curiam," or "by the court," what
disagreement they had with the Rehnquist
opinion. In the first argument, Justice
Kennedy had questioned whether the
safe-harbor provision was legally
enforceable.
For Justice O'Connor, the broadly worded
Rehnquist opinion may have violated her
rule that the court should decide cases on
the most narrow ground possible. The
holding of the per curiam was as narrow
as possible, "limited to the present
circumstances," it said.
In order to permit the majority to speak
with one voice, the chief justice and his
two allies joined the Kennedy-O'Connor
opinion. In language that was perhaps the
result of negotiations between the
majority's two factions, the opinion
contained an unusual declaration that the
principle it established was in effect a
ticket for this train only.
"Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances," the opinion said,
adding with considerable understatement,
"for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many
complexities."
The outcome was clearly one of
convenience rather than the opening shot
in a Rehnquist court equal-protection
revolution. In fact, the most telling
measure of whether the court has really
put the election trauma behind it may be
whether any dissenter is sly or
mischievous enough to cite Bush v. Gore
to bolster an equal-protection argument in
a future case.
THE MAJORITY 5
WILLIAM I REHNQUIST: Tried and
failed to get a majority for broader
grounds for overturning the Florida
Supreme Court.
ANTONIN SCALIA- Of the five justices
who voted for the stay that stopped the
recount, he alone explained his reasoning
in an unusual concurnng opinion.
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR- Despite
the Gore lawyers' hopes that she might be
open to a compromise, she did not waver
in her view that there could be no more
vote counting.
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY:
Disappointed the dissenters' hopes that he
might he open to a remand to permit
continued vote-counting under a defined
standard.
CLARENCE THOMAS: Stalwart and
silent member of the majority.
4 THE DISSENTERS
JOHN PAUL STEVENS:
Most outspoken of the dissenters, he
objected to the stay in a strong dissenting
opinion.
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agreement that the recount was flawed as Company
a basis for a compromise that could
permit the flaws to be fixed and the count
to resume.
DAVID H. SOUTER
Justice Breyer's ally in failed compromise
effort.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Saw no
constitutional problem with the recount
and no reason to take the case out of the
Florida court's hands. (pg. A18)
"The Court's Role in the 2000 Election"
Chart shows the order of events for the
2000 Election.
NOV. 21 -- Florida Supreme Court lets
recounts proceed in four counties.
NOV. 22 -- Bush appeals to United States
Supreme Court.
NOV. 24 -- Supreme Court accepts
appeal.
DEC 1 -- Case is argued.
DEC 4 -- Supreme Court unanimously
decides to vacate Florida decision, asking
for better explanation of ruling.
DEC 8 -- Florida Supreme Court
overturns lower court decision and orders
statewide recount of ballots for which
machines had registered no choice for
president.
DEC 9 -- Justices accept Bush appeal
and, by 5-to-4 vote, also grant Bush
request to stop the recount in the
meantime.
DEC 10 -- Both sides file briefs.
DEC 11 -- Case is argued.
DEC 12 -- The court rules, 5 to 4, that
recount as structured by Florida Supreme
Court is unconstitutional and that there is
no time to fix it.
DEC 13 -- Vice President Gore
concedes.
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Curious Fallout From Bush v. Gore
The New York Times
Wednesday, July 4, 2001
Alan M. Dershowitz
The final months of the Supreme Court
term that ended last week brought a spate
of unexpected decisions and unusual
voting lineups. The decisions can best be
understood against the backdrop of this
term's most controversial decision, Bush
v. Gore -- the decision that handed the
presidency to George W. Bush.
The heavy criticism of this ruling as an
exercise in partisan politics seems to have
stung the court. In reaction, several
justices may have tried to save their legacy
and prove their nonpartisanship by
moderating their views -- which led to a
term of unpredictable decisions.
Suddenly this term, Justice Antonin Scalia
abandoned his long-held disdain for
privacy rights. In Kyllo v. United States,
he wrote, in a 5-to-4 decision, that the
police may not use a thermal imaging
device that can detect marijuana growing
in a home. This decision was especially
surprising since this technology rarely
intrudes on the privacy of anyone except
marijuana growers, who use very high
intensity lamps.
Equally surprising in this case was the
dissenting vote of Justice John Paul
Stevens, who usually lines up with the
court's liberals on criminal-justice issues.
(The only predictable aspect of the Kyllo
decision was that the majority was joined
by Justice Clarence Thomas, who had
expressed similar disdain for the privacy
rights of likely criminals, but who almost
always follows Justice Scalia.)
Justice Stephen Breyer, who can generally
be counted on to favor a strict separation
of church and state, joined conservative
justices in ruling that a public school must
open its doors to after-hours religious
activities, if nonreligious programs are
allowed. The decision was a victory for a
national evangelical Christian group that
had wanted to operate after-school Bible
clubs for students.
And then there was Justice David Souter,
normally sensitive to the need to control
the discretion of police, writing a 5-to-4
majority opinion that sustained a full-
blown discretionary arrest and search --
handcuffs and all -- of a Texas soccer
mom, because her children were not
wearing seat belts. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, usually much more
conservative in her rulings, wrote the
dissent.
As surprising as these votes and decisions
may be, they all show a common
direction. Bush v. Gore seems to have
exerted a gravitational pull toward the
center for at least some of the justices.
Bush v. Gore was itself a stark example of
unpredictability -- at least if one looked to
the precedents of the court and the prior
opinions of the individual justices.
If the 100 most experienced court
watchers--conservatives, liberals and
moderates-- had been given a hypothetical
version of the facts of the Florida election
case a year ago and asked to predict how
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the justices would vote, few if any would
have gotten it right. The decisions of the
justices seemed to contradict their own
prior opinions -- and to many these
decisions seemed more consistent with
the justices' own partisan preferences.
After the vociferous criticism of the
justices -- especially but not exclusively
those in the majority -- it is
understandable that some might have
been moved later in the term to take
unexpectedly centrist positions. By
making themselves less reliably
predictable, they may seek to make their
votes in Bush v. Gore seem less partisan.
Another factor may be the rumored
retirement of Chief Justice William H
Rehnquist. Some justices may be
positioning themselves for this spot --
knowing that whoever is nominated
would probably face a protracted, partisan
Senate hearing in which he or she would
be expected to explain any extreme points
of view. Indeed, Justice O'Connor has
recently let it be known that now she is
not planning to retire anytime soon,
fueling speculation that she did not want
her career to end on the heels of so
questionable a ruling as Bush v. Gore.
There were, of course, some entirely
predictable elements in the voting patterns
of the justices. As usual, Justice Thomas
voted very often with Justice Scalia, and
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy
were the swing votes in many close cases.
Also, the trend toward closer scrutiny of
Congressional legislation that impinges on
state prerogatives--the so-called federalism
revolution -- continued unabated this past
term. A 5-to-4 majority expanded states'
immunity from federal power when it
ruled that state employees cannot sue for
damages for violations of the Americans
With Disabilities Act.
Nevertheless, this past term provided
many unexpected results. And while we
can never know for sure what motivates
individual justices, it seems likely that the
impact of Bush v. Gore was not limited to
ending the Florida hand count.
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